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Abstract 
As ‘Propaganda Theorists’ argue, an examination of key discourses can 
enhance our understanding of how economic, political and social debate is shaped by 
mainstream media reporting. In this article we present content and discourse analysis 
of Australian media reporting on the nexus of sport and terrorism. Examining 
newspaper reports over a five-year period, from 1996-2001, which included the 11 
September 2001 terrorist tragedy in the United States (9/11), provides useful insights 
into how public discourse might be influenced with regard to sport and terrorism 
interrelationships. The results of the media analysis suggest that hegemonic tropes 
are created around sport and terrorism. The distilled message is one of good and evil, 
with homilies of sport employed in metaphors for western society and its values. The 
reactions and responses of sport administrators and athletes to terrorist acts and the 
threat of terrorism to sport are used to exemplify these ideals, providing newspaper 
readers a context within which to localize meaning and relevance.  
 




In this paper we investigate both quantitative variances and qualitative 
nuances in Australian newspaper articles covering the topic of ‘sport’ and ‘terrorism’, 
pre and post the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 (known 
colloquially as 9/11). Analysis is theoretically framed using Herman and Chomsky’s 
Propaganda Model (1988) with an accompanying content analysis. As Turner noted, 
‘media texts offer especially rich opportunities to observe the cultural construction of 
meaning, locations where we can see the social production of ideas and values 
happening before our eyes’.1  This is especially relevant in the current Australian 
context, where the response to terrorism continues to assume importance as a political 
platform.  
 It has been well established that the media, in general, are potent in their 
ability to create and maintain societal perspectives.2 As key components of 
contemporary Western cultures, sport and media together provide ‘a dynamic 
metaphor of contested power and protean forms’3 whose analysis provides us with a 
way to derive meaning and sense from cultural power. More specifically, ‘when it 
comes to sport, the mass media assume an even greater importance since the 
overwhelming majority of spectators experience sporting events in their mediated 
version’.4 This media-sport nexus has resulted in a mutually reliant relationship. The 
media provides sport with publicity to attract spectators. The press, in turn, uses their 
coverage of sport as a marketing device to attract their audience.5 Thus, any 
consideration of newspapers as a sport information resource should take this 
relationship into account.  
  
 Critical to understanding this analysis is the prominence that sport coverage 
receives in the Australian media, and media’s role in determining the shape, form and 
appeal of sport.6 As Rapley and McHoul7 pointed out, newspaper texts can be 
‘repertoires for the production of locally relevant meanings…the explication of the 
way in which social (and sporting) life is produced’. However, the localizedunique 
dimensions of Australian sport media can be complemented by wider insights and 
implications about how we construct and often eulogize sport as part of social 
relations in a globalized world’.8  
 
 4 
 The global coverage attained by mass media has meant this medium was a 
significant mechanism through which people throughout the world found out about 
9/11 and its aftermath, beginning with the live satellite television broadcasts of the 
ongoing drama. In evidence, both of the authors of this paper independently watched 
CNN live in Australia as the second plane crashed into the World Trade Center and 
saw the towers collapse. The dissemination of such information is one of the media’s 
functions. But why and how selected information surrounding such events is chosen 
to be circulated, and other material is not, and the processes around the media’s 
framing of public discourses, needs to be better understood.9   
 
 By their selection of ‘newsworthy’ material the media perform a gate-keeping 
function.  ‘They provide what is seen, heard, and read, along with the type and 
amount of coverage given’.10 It may not be that they totally suppress information. 
Rather, in choosing which material is published or broadcast, ‘the main point is the 
shaping of history, the selection, the interpretation that takes place’.11 According to 
the Propaganda Model this selectivity occurs because the media perform hegemonic 
roles which advance the economic, social and political agendas of privileged groups. 
‘The media serve this purpose in many ways: through selection of topics, distribution 
of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and by 
keeping debate within the bounds of acceptable premises’.12 One topic, which can be 
examined in this light, is terrorism.  
 
 Terrorism is still making headlines more than two years after 9/11. More 
recently, in another terrorist attack, three bomb blasts in Bali killed 88 Australians and 
injured over 100 more. According to The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade: ‘the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and 12 
October 2002 in Bali have been defining events. They have changed Australia's 
security environment in significant ways’.13 These attacks helped create a moral 
panic, centred on the possibility that future terrorist attacks may occur in Australia. 
Since 9/11 the threat of terrorism has also been linked by the federal government to: 
the ongoing and divisive issue of immigration; the growing number of Muslim asylum 
seekers trying to enter the country illegally by boat (people smuggling); and 
Australia’s support of the United States in its ‘war against terrorism’.14 In 2003 the 
Australian government joined the U.S. - led ‘coalition of the willing’ and, in this 
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capacity, sent troops into Iraq as part of the alliance’s invasion force. This was the 
first time that Australian troops had launched a pre-emptive strike against another 
country. It is the media that has provided most Australians with their knowledge of 
these events. How and what information and ‘expert’ opinion the media has presented 
to the Australian public on issues such as terrorism can be explained by using the 
Propaganda Model. 
 
The Propaganda Model and the Media 
 In 1988 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky published Manufacturing 
Consent: the Politics of the Economy of the Mass Media. They advanced a functional 
theory of media the ‘Propaganda Model’, based on the premise that, in western 
capitalist societies, the dominant media are firmly embedded in the market system and 
thus mass media discourse is ‘shaped by ownership and profit orientation’.15 Thus, the 
mainstream media serve as a propaganda mechanism for power elites. As such, 
Herman and Chomsky proposed that the media frame news and allow debate only 
within the confines of selected perspectives. Similarly, the media omit many 
important particulars and stories through a system designed to sift out material that 
falls outside acceptable socio/political boundaries.16 Five filters to the media’s 
dissemination of information were presented in the model: 
(1) The size, concentrated ownership, and profit motives and orientation of the 
dominant mass media oligopolies  
(2) Advertising as the primary source of income 
(3) Reliance on information provided by government, business and ‘experts’, 
funded and approved by primary sources and agents of power 
(4) ‘Flak’ as a means of disciplining the media 
(5) ‘Anti communism’ as a control mechanism. 
 In terms of this last filter, the timing and context of when the propaganda 
model was developed need to be considered: Manufacturing Consent was written 
during the Cold War. A more current reading of the fifth filter now is acknowledged 
to be the identification of an ‘evil’ empire or dictator. Chomsky himself later accepted 
that the anticommunism tag was too narrow and that it should be: 
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a sub-case of something more general: for the system to work properly 
people have to be frightened, and they have to shelter under the wings of 
authority.. . So I think when we talked about the ‘fifth filter’ we should 
have brought in all this stuff—the way artificial fears are created with a 
dual purpose… partly to get rid of people you don’t like but partly to 
frighten the rest. Because if people are frightened they will accept 
authority… But in order to maintain that when there’s no actual threat 
requires concocting threats.17  
So, the function of this ideological filter today is generalised to be the 
marginalisation of voices which are not sufficiently in line with the genomic view, 
and limiting of debate within controlled and conventional choices.18 The Propaganda 
Model argues that in order to achieve this, the media take the set of assumptions that 
express the basic ideas of a subject and then introduce debate within a limited 
framework, enhancing the strength of the assumptions by ‘ingraining them in 
people’s minds as the entire possible spectrum of opinion there is’.19 The choice of 
experts is similarly restricted. Chomsky argues that ‘if you look at the sources 
reporters select, they are not sources that are expert, they are sources that represent 
vested interests’.20 
 As a consequence, the nature of the information that passes through all five of 
these filters, and thus is widely available in the mass media, is:  
material which reflects the interest of the ownership of the media source, does 
not offend advertising sources, relies on ‘credible’ sources from government, 
industry, and academia, does not offend prominent lobby groups or 
individuals in society, and which does not, at least, promote anti-capitalist 
views, though it is often better if it can manage to denigrate such views (or 
other marginalized ideologies) as well.21 
 This sifting of material raises reservations about the norms, values, and 
practices that govern the production of content in news-media organizations22 and 
specifically how sport journalism is presented beyond objective game results, 
statistics, and descriptions of play. 
 The Propaganda Model has its detractors, despite Chomksy’s self 
proclamation that the model ‘is one of the best-confirmed theses in the social 
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sciences. There has been no serious counter-discussion of it at all’.23 In the main, 
criticism of the propaganda model’s validity has been based on three criteria: that ‘it 
sidesteps issues of discourse within the text, it uses comparison and dichotomy to 
support its central theses and it is unclear as to its intention in dealing with 
production, text, audience and the interplay between the three’.24  
Despite these arguments the model has utility for content analysis when 
examining media coverage. In its favour Klaehn25 noted that the model does not seek 
to ‘make predictions concerning agency and/or subjectivity. Rather, it highlights the 
fact that awareness, perception and understandings are typically constrained and 
informed by structures of discourse’. He also observes that there are ‘clear 
methodological techniques with which to test the substantive hypotheses advanced by 
the Propaganda Model’.26  
Just as the model does not imply that media audiences have no agency, it also 
does not signify that they read media texts in simplistic ways, nor that they construct 
meanings in ways that have not been negotiated. ‘What it does do is highlight the fact 
that perception, awareness and understanding are informed and constrained by the 
structure of the discourse in question’.27 Thus, given that the media is a major 
determiner in shaping community attitudes and values28, it follows that material 
regarding sport and terrorism that passes through the filters and the mass media 
circulates will, at least in part, shape public discourse.  
 In terms of the use of ‘experts’ Martin identified a three-tier categorization of 
sources used in the media. ‘Primary’ sources consist of those associated with ‘the 
professional and managerial culture of society's chief political, economic, intellectual 
and control institutions’, who, Martin asserts, ‘basically define the essential aspects 
and features of a newsworthy event or issues; they are the ones who tell the media - 
and us - what the event is really all about’.29 At the next level are two distinct sets of 
‘secondary news sources’: ‘one involves ordinary people who are featured in the news 
as a source of moral and emotional reaction to an event or issue... The other types of 
secondary sources are representatives of oppositional groups or social movements... 
who also play a reactive, role’.30 Finally, Martin's31 third tier consists of: those who 
are excluded altogether from the news. These missing voices often come from the 
extremes of the class structure: at the bottom are those who lack the power to make 
their point of view newsworthy; at the top are those who have the power to conceal 
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their point of view from the news. This viewpoint too is in keeping with the 
Propaganda Model’s selection and use of experts. 
As public opinion, perceptions, and expectations have been a contributing 
factor in formulating polices and practices in Australian sport32 then an examination 
of the media’s framing of sport and terrorism will provide better understandings of 
how its nexus has helped shape the current environment in which sport is practiced 
and managed.  
 
Terrorism 
Whilst the etymology of terrorism can be traced back to the Latin verb terrere, 
(meaning to arouse fear), the term only came into usage during the French Revolution 
(1793-94), although terrorism per se existed long before this. In terms of the mass 
media’s relationship to terrorism, ‘terrorism—… custom-made for TV cameras—first 
appeared on 22 July, 1968, when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
undertook the first terrorist hijacking of a commercial airplane’.33 Because of this 
connection scholars have conceptualised terrorism within the framework of symbolic 
communication theory.34 In 1975 Jenkins35 noted that ‘terrorist attacks are often 
carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and 
international press… Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual 
victims. Terrorism is a theatre’.  
 
From an operational perspective no single definition of terrorism has gained 
global acceptance36 despite more than 100 definitions being proposed to international 
organizations37, as attempts to gain consensus have ‘proven impossible to satisfy fully 
the demands of either politics or scholarship’.38 While some academics claim that a 
standardised definition of terrorism is necessary and a prerequisite to combating it, 
others believe that an objective and internationally accepted definition of terrorism 
can never be fully agreed upon, as any categorization of it is influenced by 
interpretation, personal perception and exploitation.39 Because of these latter 
constraints, concurrence on an acceptable definition of terrorism has eluded the 
United Nations for over 30 years. Even before this, attempts to arrive at an 
internationally standard definition were begun under the League of Nations.40  
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The absence of agreement on a specific, unequivocal meaning for terrorism 
has resulted in a number of far ranging consequences; from the fact that that 
legislating against it is problematic41, to the reality that people fighting oppression 
have been branded pejoratively as terrorist by their adversaries.42  
 
Despite the lack of a collectively acceptable definition, there is a range of 
functional definitions that serve the needs of the organizations that utilize them. 
‘Some of these focus on the special nature on the victims of terror; some stress the 
difference between the victims and the true goal of terror; other definitions focus on 
the violent act itself, its abnormal nature, or the unusual character of its 
perpetrators’.43 For example, the United States’ State Department, labels terrorism as 
‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant 
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience’.44 Another, longer standing, designation is:  
the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or group, whether 
acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is 
designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target 
group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that 
group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.45 
 
 Semantic differentiations between definitions withstanding, according to Paul 
Pillar, a former deputy chief of the United States’ CIA's Counter Terrorist Center, 
there are four key elements of a terrorist act. These are that it is:  
 premeditated, rather than an impulsive act of anger  
 political, rather than criminal, and designed to destabilise the existing political 
order  
 aimed at civilians, not at military targets   
 carried out by sub-national groups, not by the army of a country.46 
 It is generally accepted that terrorism: has always been purposeful; is political 
in its motives; implies violence or threats thereof; is indiscriminate in its choice of 
targets; as well as being designed to have consequences beyond its immediate 
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target/s.47 Thus, although the victims may not be preselected, there is a strategy 
behind terrorists’ actions. The significant intent is that terrorism is politically 
motivated and it is this purpose that distinguishes it from other forms of violence such 
as murder or football hooliganism.48  
 While terrorist acts have had a variety of goals, Selth49 has classified them into 
four broad (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) typologies:  
 domestic (actions by groups or individuals against others in the same country)  
• state (terror used by authorities to maintain their position within a nation) 
• international (terrorism directed at foreign nationals or governments)  
 state sponsored (terrorist tactics used by agents of the state, or independent groups 
to pursue foreign policy aims.  
Of these categories it is the last, that is, state sponsored terrorism, which is 
believed to have killed the most people.50 Selth’s last three groupings can include 
members of the military as either perpetrators or victims, thus this model contradicts 
Pillar’s requisites of a terrorist act. 
 Given the above variations in definitions and classifications, it stands to reason 
that the motivations that drive terrorists are also varied. These motivations have been 
classified into three spheres: rational, psychological and cultural51, although a terrorist 
may be influenced by a combination of two or more of these. The rational component 
involves weighing up possible positive and negative outcomes by making a cost-
benefit analysis before deciding to act. Psychological motivation for terrorism derives 
from personal overwhelming personal feelings of injustice and frustration. In terms of 
cultural motivation, terrorism may be tolerated, or even condoned, in some societies 
where there is commitment to and perceived benefits from self-sacrifice for a suitable 
cause. Thus, any one of these motivations may result in terrorist acts occurring where 
people are playing and/or watching sport. 
 
Sport and terrorism 
While there have been several examples of terrorism in sport, which we will discuss 
later, the study of violence in sport has primarily examined player and/or spectator 
behaviour. Specialist literature on the relationship between sport and terrorism is rare 
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despite the fact that in recent times sport, like many other activities, has been 
acknowledged to be vulnerable to terrorist activities.52 Little work has been carried 
out on ‘actual or threatened acts of violence that may be associated with sporting 
practices and cultures, but not directly prompted by action on the playing field’, such 
as terrorism.53 According to Atkinson and Young54: 
While sports may seemingly share few conceptual links with acts of 
terrorism… we cannot ignore how sports events may become targets of 
terrorism… or the contexts of terrorism…. For many reasons, individual 
terrorists or terrorist organizations might find suitable targets in athletes 
participating in games, spectators attending the events, or selected corporate 
sponsors of sports contests. 
 Because of the reach of television, the greater the viewing audience of a 
sporting event, the more ‘terrorism capital’ it possesses. Accordingly, the Olympic 
Games and other mega-sporting events have been considered to be prime terrorism 
targets since satellite broadcasts created real-time, global television audiences. The 
most notorious example of terrorism in sport occurred in 1972 at the Munich Olympic 
Games, when members of the Palestinian group ‘Black September’ infiltrated the 
Olympic Village and stormed the Israeli team quarters, killing a Israeli wrestling 
coach and taking ten other Israeli athletes and officials hostage. An ineffective rescue 
attempt resulted in the deaths of all of the Israelis, a German policeman and a number 
of the terrorists. Since this time security at the Games become more rigorous and is an 
essential and expensive part of the organising committee’s planning.  
Other connections can also be drawn between sport and terrorism. Sport 
spaces have been converted to sites of state sponsored terrorism. For example, in 
Afghanistan, Kabul’s main sport venue, Ghazi Stadium, whose construction had been 
financed by the International Monetary Fund, was used by the Taliban to carry out 
public executions and amputations.55 Also, physical activity has formed part of some 
terrorists’ preparation. Broughton56 noted that ‘Islamic radicals …needed a lot of 
training, especially physical training. The ways in which the media have portrayed 
these events and reported other terrorism and sport stories has implications for how 





The term content analysis applies to ‘a variety of research techniques, all of 
which are used for systematically collecting, analysing and making inferences from 
messages’57. Later definitions have indicated further refinements, namely ‘a research 
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context’.58 
 This study used relational content analysis. This involved establishing the 
existence, frequency and nature of concepts, then quantifying and explaining their 
nature, and lastly exploring their relationships. In other words, the focus was on 
uncovering semantic, or consequential, associations. Individual concepts, in and of 
themselves, were viewed as having no inherent meaning. Rather, meaning was seen to 
be the product of the relationships among the concepts identified.   
Shapiro and Markoff59 contended that content analysis is only a valid and 
meaningful tool if related to other measures. Thus, the Propaganda Model can provide 
a legitimate point of reference to study selected sport media texts and draw inferences 
about the Australian sportscape. According to Rintala and Birrell60, content analysis 
‘assumes that people are influenced… by what they hear, see or read from the mass 
media… What the media chooses to cover and how they provide this coverage has an 
influence on who participates in sport, is recognized for that participation, and reaches 
a certain level of fulfilment through that participation’.  
A search of the Dow Jones Interactive database using the keywords ‘sport’ 
and ‘terrorism’ indicated that there had been 522 newspaper articles, with both of 
these words included, published in the Australian media between January 1966 and 
December 2001, a period that included the September 11th tragedy. Three hundred 
and fourteen of these articles had been published since 9/11. The database included 
the major newspapers of the five states and the Australian Capital Territory, the major 
Sunday newspapers, a national newspaper and affiliated regional papers.  
Every article was read and those that were not deemed germane were 
discarded. These discards included items that contained multiple news stories under 
one headline banner, or a summary of sport results followed by a different story about 
terrorist activity. The remaining 275 newspaper articles, which had been published in 
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13 major Australian newspapers and 36 regional papers, as detailed in Figure 1, were 
then used as the sample.  
 
Insert figure one here. 
  
As textual analysis attempts to investigate and expose ‘hidden’ meanings 
inherent in cultural texts, particularly those of the media61, for the analysis we focused 
on meanings that intersected with cultural representations of sport and terrorism. How 
particular messages were reinforced or marginalized, based on the structure and key 
messages of the text, required a close reading of each article at several different 
levels: as a singular text, in relation to other passages and articles, and to the wider 
context of Australian sport.  
 Data containing multiple meanings required interpretive coding that was 
subtle and flexible, but still reliable and valid. We aimed to construct and combine 
categories from the data, further refining and linking them as meanings became 
clearer. As our understanding grew, articles were revisited, and connections were 
drawn between data and theory. We used a software package (NVivo) that was 
designed to code complex data for multiple meanings and retrieve according to 
patterns of codes. Each article was coded with a base of four attributes: date, 
publication name, timing (pre or post 9/11) and type of article (fact only, opinion or 
mixed). Broad themes and sub-themes were identified and coded, segments ranged in 
scope from words, to sentences, paragraphs, passages and even entire articles. Figure 
2 depicts the classification categories used and sub-themes. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
  
Data were then exported to a statistical package (SPSS) for further analysis 
and data reduction procedures. For example, the date values were used in analyses of 
the longitudinal dimension of the newspaper reports. Thus, we were able to classify 
the articles for quantitative exploration as well as for qualitative discovery and 
interpretation of meanings. Scoping of searches, using a range of combinations of 
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documents, nodes, and attributes, was utilised to seek relationships in the articles’ 
source (by newspaper), date of publication, type of article and the framing of 
intersections of sport and terrorism. We worked with several reiterations of the 




Of the 275 sport and terrorism related articles in Australian newspapers 
between 1996 and 2001 inclusive, only 20 of these articles (7%) were written before 
September 2001; this immediately indicated the escalation of interest in the topic post 
9/11. A further cross-integration of the eight other categories, indicated above in 
Figure 2, with the four designated attributes, resulted in four key groupings: (1) 
reporting voice, that is the tone and orientation of the article; (2) relationships drawn 
between sport or sportsperson and 9/11; (3) direct impact on sport events; and (4) 
flow-on effects on sport post-9/11. The first two categories explore indirect and 




Each article was ascribed to one of three reporting voices: 38 were written as 
factual (reporting with no judgement or opinion offered), 128 mixed (inclusion of 
‘facts’ along with the author’s opinion or interpretation) and 109 were principally 
opinion-based (the focus of the article was to offer the author’s judgment with little, if 
any relevant factual material included). There were no significant statistical 
differences found between different newspapers and the range of voice used by the 
writers. That is, each newspaper contained articles written in each of the three 
different voices. 
  In terms of chronology, articles written in the period before 9/11 (20) were 
either in the opinion or mixed voice categories. Of these, 72 percent appeared in the 
Sydney Morning Herald (48%) or the Melbourne paper The Age (35%). From 9 
September 2001, and for two months following, articles in all three voices were 
published, however, after that time, articles were again more likely to be mixed or 
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opinion (70%).  This was despite the fact that the increasing number of articles also 
contained material listing sporting events and tours that had been cancelled. The 
writing voice used by the author in these categories was further sub-classified 
according to its emotional dimension, that is, its tone. This sub-grouping category 
encompassed humour/irony, critical, supportive and fear-related sentiments. Some 90 
articles (33%) connected sport to fervent expressions of nationalism, defiance. The 
counterview, the ‘irrelevance’ of sport in the face of major loss of human life, also 
featured, but less prominently. The bulk of these articles (53) were cries to use sport 
as a tool to counteract and to stand up to terrorism and to deride selected sportspeople 
who did not do so: 
‘In their terrible aftermath, America and its friends have defiantly gone on 
with their lives, refusing to allow the terrorists the victory of closing down our way of 
life…That is what makes the cancellation of the Kangaroo Rugby League tour to the 
United Kingdom so disappointing. In this confrontation between terrorism and 
something our society values and enjoys the terrorists have won’.62 Reflections about 
the place of sport in the Australian psyche (15 articles) also appeared but were less 
prevalent. ‘After the horrific events of September 11, I started to wonder about the 
relevance of sport. …It was so hard to think of a sporting event in any sort of context 
after that tragedy’.63 
There were only a small number (3 articles) that used irony, including: 
Osama bin Laden has stopped the Kangaroo tour to Britain. Allah be 
praised. It has taken years of careful planning, of course. FBI sources in 
Washington say there is intelligence now which proves the destruction of 
Australian rugby league has been a prime bin Laden objective for at least a 
decade, with highly trained sleeper agents long ago planted at the heart of 
the game. `Bin Laden chooses his targets well; the American embassies in 
Africa, the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and now rugby league, 
the world's most widely loved international sport. They will stop at 
nothing..64 
It was not only articles based on the effects of 9/11 that linked sport and 
terrorism through irony. Articles that appeared about sport and the Afghan regime, the 
Taliban (8), were generally cynical: ‘The Taliban supported cricket in the hope of 
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tricking the Western World, particularly the British, into thinking ‘look we are ready 
to compromise. We’re even playing cricket’.65 Others were even more pejorative: 
Once home to soccer and basketball games, Kabul's Ghazi Stadium is now 
used for public executions …``But now,'' he said, ``the place is a religious 
concentration camp. I always thought that sports was a great leavening 
tool, but the Afghans' lives under Taliban rule are kind of like HL 
Mencken's description of a Puritan, living in mortal dread that somewhere 
someone is having fun’.'66 
 
Relationship drawn between sport or sport person and 9/11 
A substantial number of articles (114) were written about the decisions of 
sportspersons whether or not to travel and compete in events during the period 
immediately post 9/11. These included descriptions of how ‘brave’ sport persons were 
who continued to compete (ski aerialists Alisa Camplin and Jacqui Cooper, swimmer 
Brooke Hanson, tennis star Lleyton Hewitt), and how other sport persons pulled out 
of competitions (golfer Robert Allenby, archer Simon Fairweather). Such withdrawal 
was written about as both courageous (11 articles) and cowardly (28 articles), 
depending on the sport and the athlete. The reports in this category were generally 
wide ranging, covering a number of different sport persons and team. However, three 
concentrations did emerge. These included 16 articles about Tiger Wood’s decisions 
about travel to overseas tournaments; 21 articles on the decision of the Kangaroos 
(Australia’s National Rugby League team) to postpone, and subsequently reinstate, 
their tour of Britain late in 2001; and 51 articles on Indigenous Australian boxer Tony 
Mundine’s public comments about the ‘cause’ of 9/11. Tiger Woods was the standout 
non-Australian sportsperson quoted and referred to in relation to 9/11. For example:  
Woods yesterday announced he had withdrawn from next week's 
tournament in France, seen as a Ryder Cup warm-up for many players. 
‘Due to the tragic events over the past few days, I have decided not to 
compete in next week's Trophee Lancome in Saint-Nom-la-Breteche GC,’ 
Woods said in a statement released on his website. ‘I don't believe this is 
an appropriate time to play competitive golf. I feel strongly that it is a time 
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to pause, reflect and remember the victims.’ According to Woods' agent, 
the world's No1 golfer had not even thought about the Ryder Cup.67 
The articles on Tiger Woods reported his withdrawal from tournament play 
with no hint of disapproval and in many cases respect was given to his decision. This 
endorsement was in marked contrast to the almost total condemnation of the 
Kangaroo’s initial decision not to tour. Questions were raised about the team’s lack of 
courage.  
One wonders what Australia's SAS troops preparing to go into 
Afghanistan made of the Kangaroos' decision, or the sailors on HMAS 
Sydney who left port yesterday for a hazardous assignment in the Persian 
Gulf. Military forces are putting themselves in harm's way so that 
Australians can continue to enjoy freedoms often taken for granted. It does 
rugby league no credit, particularly at a moment when its international 
credibility is already in tatters, for its showcase team to be seen to be 
cowering in the face of evil. How sad that players who have built their 
reputations on never surrendering have handed Osama bin Laden such an 
easy victory.68 
 
Even more disparaging was the article that condemned the Kangaroos by 
comparing their decision to similar options taken by marginalized Australian groups. 
‘In criticising the Kangaroos, some callers cited the fact that ballerinas, Aboriginal 
singers and theatre actors decided to go ahead with a month-long Australian artistic 
tour of New York only weeks after the September 11 attacks, but the Kangaroos 
wouldn’t’.69 The Australian newspaper took comparisons a step further, pointing out 
that the popular, skivvy-wearing, children's band, The Wiggles, were leaving shortly 
for concerts in New York and Washington, thus showing more courage than the 
league players.70 
 
 Leading newspapers used their editorials to also criticise the sport’s national 
governing body, the Australian Rugby League, suggesting a new team should be 
selected made up of players who wanted to tour. The Daily Telegraph's cartoon 
featured a picture of the Australian test jersey, with a caption, ‘The latest in big girls' 
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blouses’. Its front page included a digitally altered official team photograph of the 
players who did want to tour the UK and ‘still beat Great Britain’.  
Australian sportsmen have been criticised in London’s The Times … The 
Times suggested Australia and America tended to see the world outside as 
a benighted wilderness: ‘here be dragons, here be savages, here be bad 
plumbing’.71 
  
Only a limited number of articles were supportive of such Australians who 
cancelled sport appearances. 
What is wrong and contemptible is the branding of late or non-starters as 
wimps and cowards. Good on the skiers and swimmers for going. Good on 
the golfers and cricketers for taking five. Good on the league players for 
not going at all, and if some change their mind, good on them as well. And 
shame on anyone who does not respect their free choice.72 
When the Kangaroos eventually reversed their initial decision and rescheduled 
the tour to the United Kingdom, the press opined that the team had ‘suddenly gone 
from villains to heroes … they are to be congratulated for facing these issues, dealing 
with them and agreeing to come’.73 
 
Articles dealing with boxer Tony Mundine’s public comments about 9/11 
were nearly all opinion pieces. Mundine had offered his opinion as to the root cause 
of 9/11 on a television show: ‘they call it an act of terrorism but if you can understand 
religion and our way of life it's not about terrorism. It's about fighting for God's laws, 
and America's brought it upon themselves (for) what they've done in the history of 
time.’ - Anthony Mundine getting himself into all sorts of bother.74 Columnists 
condemned him and the letters and editorial sections bitterly criticised him.  
The trouble with speaking too quickly is one's mouth is likely to say 
something one's brain hasn't thought out yet. That, regrettably, appears to 
be the fate that has befallen Anthony Mundine, a swaggering braggart of a 
boxer whose mouth, like his fists, seems to operate in a different time zone 
from his tardier thought processes. His remark this week that the 
Americans brought the September 11 terrorist attack on themselves was, 
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on one level, nothing more than a young man's unthinking comment: an 
ignorant response to a question for which he had no scripted answer. Yet 
there is a line beyond which stupidity and inexperience cease to be a 
defence for offensive behaviour. Mundine didn't just cross over it; he 
somersaulted over it, just as he regularly used to do as he celebrated 
crossing the tryline during his rugby league career.75 
 
However, while there was widespread disapproval of the content of his 
comments, there was also a smaller number of articles supporting his right to voice an 
opinion, however unpopular or ill intentioned it may be.  
American boxing writers have come to the defence of Anthony Mundine 
and accused the World Boxing Council of hypocrisy over its decision to 
indefinitely drop the outspoken Australian from its ratings. …’You don't 
have to approve of what Mundine said to defend his right to say it.’ 
ESPN.com boxing writer Tim Graham also defended Mundine's right to 
speak his mind ‘however addled it might be’, though he labelled the 
Australian a ‘dunce’ and a ‘dunderhead’ for his comments.76 
 
Let me get this straight. Anthony Mundine said WHAT?!?! You mean to 
tell me that instead of expressing the standard-brand white-bread view on 
the New York atrocities ``it was an attack on liberty and the flame of 
freedom etc.'' he put forward a different perspective entirely?!?!? Just what 
can he be thinking of? The worst of it, of course, is he calls himself a 
``former rugby league player''! Did he learn nothing in their ranks? Did 
no-one tell him: ``Whatever else, Anthony, speak only in bland cliches 
that can never offend anyone. Just roll 'em out, saying absolutely nothing 
along the way, and then we can all get some sleep”.77 
 
Sports personalities were brought in to comment as ‘experts’ on the Mundine 
issue and contributed to the debate. ‘Former world boxing champion Jeff Fenech said 
the remarks were in bad taste and made Mundine a poor role model for younger 
boxers. ‘This is a scary time for a lot of people and we all have to stick together, so 
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comments like these are absolutely stupid,’ Fenech said. A bit below the belt for even 
The Mouth.78 
 
In other articles (68) sports or sport persons were shown to join together in 
support of Americans in the aftermath of 9/11.  
Surfers worldwide had already indicated they would back the Americans 
in any decision they made after the terrorist attacks and not compete 
without them. ASP president and CEO Wayne Bartholomew expressed 
sympathy and support for the US surfers. ‘The ebb and flow of this 
decision has been an agonising and harrowing process,’ he said. 
‘However, at the end of the day, this situation represents an unprecedented 
emergency and the sport stands behind the American surfers.’ Although 
disappointed by the truncated tour, Australian Luke Egan, who is all but 
out of contention for this year's title, conceded safety was the No1 priority 
for everyone. ‘I'm deeply disappointed at the decision, but we all said last 
week that we would leave it up to the Americans and support them in 
whatever they decided,’ he said.79 
 
The Dubai sheiks have been unequivocal in their condemnation of 
terrorism. ‘We are 100 per cent against it and 100 per cent with America 
to get these people to justice,’ said Sheik Mohammed immediately after 
the September 11 atrocities. And to prove it, the Godolphin stable will 
donate all prizemoney won between September 11 and the end of this year 
to the relief appeal a sum which could top $US20 million ($39.3m) and 
Sheik Mohammed donated $US5million to the Red Cross immediately 
after the attacks.80 
 
Sport as a panacea and a place of escape from the world’s ills was another 
theme found in the media reports (41 articles). Headlines such as ‘Football transports 
us to a place where real tragedy and heartbreak don’t exist’81 reflected the sentiments 
contained in these pieces. The counter viewpoint, that sport is unimportant (36 
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articles), was also a prominent theme. ‘There is no event, no sport, nothing can come 
close to being discussed or even considered when it comes to what happened’.82 
 
Impact on sport events 
In terms of sport events, 370 passages were classified as having content related to the 
direct impact of 9/11 on the staging of sport. Of these, 241 were about the 
cancellation or continuation of events, 181 covered the withdrawal of an athlete from 
an event and 58 discussed the new security measures which would need to be 
implemented. Sport administrators were the most frequently appearing ‘experts’ (129 
citings) who were called on to discuss this, closely followed by athletes (114 citings). 
Conspicuously absent were terrorism experts, who were not represented in the articles 
sampled. 
English cricket faces possibly its gravest and certainly its most expensive 
crisis on the eve of the tour to India, The Sunday Telegraph of London 
reports. While several key players are on the brink of pulling out for their 
own safety, the ICC is insisting tours to India must go ahead and the hosts 
are threatening financial reprisals if England withdraw. A cancellation of 
the tour, due to start on November 14, would cost England at least 
$20million and could bankrupt the ECB.83 
  
The event which received the most coverage in this category was the Salt Lake 
City Winter Olympic Games, with a total of 33 passages. These reports outlined the 
International Olympic Committee’s commitment to proceed with the Games (as 
panacea) and also the strict security measures which would need to be put in place to 
deal with threat of terrorism.  
Metal detectors will be installed in central areas and radiation checks will 
be made by aircraft seeking signs of nuclear terrorism. Mail to Olympic 
participants will be closely supervised, if not suspended. Contingency 
plans to fly athletes into the city in case of another US flying ban are in 
place. The airport will shut down during the opening and closing 
ceremonies. Large supplies of medicines, including antibiotics, have been 
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brought in, as have portable decontamination units. F-16s and helicopters 
will patrol overhead while 1,000 FBI agents will trawl the crowds. 84 
  
Flow-on effects on sport post-9/11, such as security and insurance issues, 
were a further theme (219 articles) that received substantive coverage. The bulk 
of these (201) reported security concerns surrounding sport events and/or travel to 
sport events: ‘the latest sporting fallout from the global security crisis, defending 
champion the United States withdrew yesterday from the Fed Cup final scheduled 
for Madrid for November 7-11. “The situation created by terrorist acts made it 
inadvisable for elite American athletes to compete abroad as a team representing 
the United States at this time," the US Tennis Association said’ was indicative of 
articles within this theme.85  
 The events of 9/11 created intense media discourse which spilled over into 
many areas of society, impacting on a range of institutions, including sport. 
Newspaper stories linking sport and terrorism were abundant, conveying messages of 
dismay, defiance, deference, and derision. The four classifications used above are 
offered as one way of interpreting the relationships the media drew between sport and 
terrorism, and the resulting presentations and characterisations of sport, its players 
and administrators. Whether these relationships are authentic or manufactured can be 
explored through the framework of the Propaganda Model. 
 
Discussion 
Propaganda campaigns can occur only when the message to be conveyed is 
consistent with the interests of those controlling and managing the media filters.86 
There can be no denying that many of the stories connected with 9/11 were extremely 
newsworthy and the topic deserved attention. However, in the articles classified as 
‘opinion’ or ‘mixed’ in their tone, the interrelationships between 9/11 and sport were 
almost exclusively cast to either highlight the stoicism of athletes who demonstrated 
‘patriotism’ through their on field-actions and opinions, or criticise sportspersons who 
were not supportive of the US stance on terrorism. As Whannel87 noted, ‘the media 
narrativises the events of sport, transforming them into stories with stars and 
characters; heroes and villains’. The framing of these characterisations created tropes 
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that reinforced the government’s anti-terrorism policy and fuelled the growing moral 
panic about Australia’s safety, multicultural problems in the community, the danger 
of accepting illegal boatpeople from the Middle East as refugees, and the central role 
of sport in reinforcing the Western way of life and its accompanying ideals.  
 
 For example, stories about sport and the Taliban were only newsworthy if they 
reinforced the popular view of a repressive and violent regime. In the Anthony 
Mundine case, further propaganda points could be scored against Muslims, and 
additional concern could be expressed for his perceived insensitivity to the victims of 
9/11. As the reporting of his battle to retain his world boxing ranking demonstrated, 
the sport community, business interests and government ideology were united in their 
desire to protect the commercial sport product, rather than supporting of the 
democratic notion of free speech.  
 
The review of the themes that emerged from the content analysis can be 
related back each of the Propaganda model’s filters, although it is beyond the scope of 
this investigation to ascertain the degree of ‘flak’ the federal government applied to 
newspapers which did not agree with their policy direction on the issue, and also the 
effects of the coverage on the relationship of mainstream media organizations with 
their advertisers.  
 
The first filter, ownership, has become an important aspect of the Australian 
sport/media complex. There are only two major newspaper organizations in Australia. 
The first, News Corporation (owned by Rupert Murdoch), has a market share of: 68 
per cent of the capital city and national newspapers; 77 per cent of the Sunday 
newspapers; 62 per cent of the suburban newspapers; and 18 per cent of the regional 
newspapers. The second is John Fairfax Holdings, an Australian publishing group, 
with no single dominant shareholder. Fairfax papers account for: 21 per cent of the 
capital city and national newspaper market; 22 per cent of the Sunday newspaper 
market; 17 per cent of the suburban newspaper market; and 16 per cent of the regional 
newspaper market. 88  
 
 Because of the variety of markets that these two commercial holdings target, 
they seek to maximize their profits with economies of scale. One such outcome is that 
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the professional autonomy of regional journalists to pursue unique or independent 
storylines has been reduced, demonstrated by the repetition of core story lines in the 
articles analyzed. Stories first appeared in a major city newspaper owned by one of 
the elite owners, such Fairfax, and were recycled in slightly different formats in their 
syndicated newspapers.  
 
 The third filter, sourcing, was also evident as a mechanism of elite influence. 
There were only a small number of key sources, many of which were international 
syndicated news agencies such as AAP and Reuters, which provided original copy, 
especially involving foreign events and athletes. This further accentuated repetition of 
the same headlines, story lines and bylines appearing over and over in regional 
papers. Such repetitive headlines included: ‘Mundine to learn from mistakes’89, 
‘Fighting For The Right To Be Stupid’90, ‘Mundine warned belt up or else’91, and 
‘The trouble with shooting from the lip’.92 
 
 The fifth filter, the former anticommunist ideology, was obvious through an 
almost religious adherence in the mainstream political stance, painting terrorism as 
encroachment on the Western way of life. By making Australia and the US seem 
utopian, writers adopted an ideological/moralistic position from which to comment on 
sport and the actions of sportspersons. The perceived poor quality of life for those 
living in countries such as Afghanistan was also used as a heuristic tool, serving to 
accentuate differences between political and religious ideologies. All newspapers 
evidenced this approach. 
This is not in keeping with the conclusion of Whitlam and Preston93, who 
found considerable differences in subjectivity between the broadsheets and the 
tabloids in their coverage of sport. They found that tabloids provided a brief overview 
of the popular sports, along with speculation designed to ‘provoke conversation in the 
workplace or pub’. In this study we did not find any significant differences between 
the styles of coverage provided in the tabloids (for example, The Daily Telegraph and 
the Sun-Herald) compared with the broadsheets (for example, the Age and the Sydney 
Morning Herald). Similarly, there did not appear to be variations in the ‘expert’ 
sources the newspapers quoted (for example, Tiger Woods and Jacques Rogge) and 
the focus of their pronouncements. 
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 According to Martin94 and Herman and Chomsky95, the nexus of sport and 
terrorism is reported from the perspective of those whose understanding of 
authoritative sources directs them to seek personalities and major events that link 
sport to the terrorism threat. Moreover, the lens they use to tie observation to 
explanation is shaped from afar, by those who are unlikely to ever have experienced 
terrorist situations first hand and whose reality reinforces the good versus evil 
discourse of the Propaganda Model’s fifth filter. A fundamental issue raised by this 
analysis is the extent to which the media should even be regarded as a key source for 
more textured and complete portrayals of other sporting issue. Considering the 
media’s global reach and multinational ownership concentration this raises questions, 
not only for sport academics, but also for sport management practitioners.  
 
Conclusion 
The historical significance of September 11, 2001 is unquestionable; the 
events of that day have changed the way in which many view the world. The media 
imagery of sport and terrorism, presented via the articles analysed, emphasize the 
centrality of sport and athletes as representative of the way Australians seek to 
understand world events.  These stories reinforced the dominant constructions of 
social reality and were introduced and reinforced through sport narratives and the use 
of athletes and sport administrators (predominantly male) as experts, despite the fact 
that their knowledge of terrorism was often not demonstrated or explored and there 
was no evidence provided that they were physically present in New York city on 9/1 
or at any other terrorist target.  
A strong theme of the articles was the use of sport as a signifier of defiance 
against terrorism and its attempts to strike at the western way of life. Statements such 
as: ‘We will not bow to terrorism. We will not cower and hide. Business will resume, 
sport will be played and harsh light will shine into caverns where evil flourishes’96, 
exemplify this attitude. 
 Stories that exposed any possible racist undertones of the reporting, 
acknowledged the cultural complexities of terrorism, or were critical of the west, were 
rare. The sheer increase in the number of articles post 9/11 about sport and terrorism, 
 26 
despite the fact that sport itself was not a direct target of the terrorists, demonstrates 
how the media create propaganda links. How these links are read is another issue. 
While the Propaganda Model filters information, it acknowledges that the media 
audience is not merely a passive receiver or necessarily believes that all that is written 
is accurate. Questioning of government and media sanctioned rhetoric is evidenced in 
the intense public debate which still surrounds Australia’s responses to the threat of 
terrorism. 
While there were parallels, tropes and metaphors drawn about the links 
between sport and terrorism, the indisputable centrality of sport to the Australian 
imagination was more immediately evidenced by one telling statistic: ‘In the week of 
the hijacking crisis, Andrew Johns [the Newcastle rugby league captain] was the 
third most mentioned person in the Herald- behind George W. Bush and John 
Howard but ahead of Osama Bin Laden.’ Newcastle Herald, 25/9/01, p11. Andrew 
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Figure 1: Articles by newspaper 
Paper No. Articles % 
  Daily Telegraph 48 17.45 
  Sydney Morning Herald 40 14.55 
  Illawarra Mercury 22 8 
  The Age 22 8 
  Courier Mail 19 6.91 
  Herald Sun 16 5.82 
  Adelaide Advertiser 14 5.09 
  Newcastle Herald 14 5.09 
  Hobart Mercury 12 4.36 
  Sun Herald 9 3.27 
  Canberra Times 8 2.91 
  Gold Coast Bulletin 8 2.91 
  Sunday Telegraph 7 2.55 
  Other 36 13.09 
  Total 275 100 
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Figure 2: Coding Schema  
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